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Abstract 
 It is unquestionable both theoretically and empirically that trade in competitive 
markets is the best way to promote the efficient allocation of goods. Nevertheless, there 
could be some traders’ strategies that interfere with competition, collusion among 
traders, which results in losses to society. 
 In this work, I study the implication that guarantees have on the competitiveness 
of the market when information is imperfect and costly. In formal terms, I study the 
‘price matching’ and ‘price beating’ guarantees that may be extended to other types of 
guarantee. 
From the theoretical model it results that both strategies are anti-competitive 
strategy but, contrary to ‘price matching’, ‘price beating’ is not in the best interest of 
sellers (in a Nash equilibrium perspective).  
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1. Introduction 
Guarantees are declarations from seller that its products have a certain quality 
standard. So, guarantees only make sense if they are a commitment on a characteristic 
that buyers do not known perfectly and if there is a compensation in case the claim is 
not accurate. Otherwise, it is “cheap talk” (e.g., Farrell, 1987). 
The imperfect knowledge results from the existence of a search cost (e.g. the 
quantification of the effort to acquire the information) or resulting from the value to be 
realized in future (Lippman and McCall, 1981). 
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Firm’s guarantees may be in absolute or relative terms. The most common in 
absolute terms is the “good functioning” which encompass a legal obligation imposed 
on sellers that artifacts will be “good functioning” for at least a certain period of time. 
Other common guarantee is the “return if not pleased” by which a seller sustains that a 
buyer will not regret from the purchase. 
Guarantees in relative terms are based on a comparison between goods, e.g., a 
cleaning product seller assuring that “this product cleans better that others”. 
The question I discuss in this work is whether guaranteeing is a strategy that 
increases competition between traders, which conduces to better products with smaller 
prices or, on the contrary, it turns possible sellers to collude, behaving as if they were 
monopolists, decreasing quality and increasing prices. 
 In this work I present a market equilibrium model with sellers guaranteeing in 
relative terms that their prices are no higher than other firms’ prices. Then, I investigate 
whether it is, a priori, optimal sellers to promise paying the price difference or adding to 
that a compensation sum in case that the buyer discovers the claim is false. 
Contrary to Corts (1995), I assume that buyers do not have perfect knowledge of 
prices. 
 
2. First strategy: firms matching other firms’ prices 
 There are N identical firms that have constant and null marginal cost. 
 A firm sets the price and guarantees that it matches other firms’ prices. 
 Firms do not know prices affixed by other firms. 
 There are Q buyers, being  the fraction of uninformed buyers (that only known 
the price of one seller) and being (1– ) the fraction of informed buyers (that known the 
price of two sellers). 
 The assumption that there are a percentage of buyers that know the price of only 
a seller, tourists, is used, among others, in Salop and Stiglitz (1977), Wilde and 
Schwartz (1979) and Burdett and Judd (1983). If all buyers are identical, it is known 
from the literature that informed buyers only have to know the prices set by two firms 
(Burdett and Judd, 1983, p. 962, cl. 1).  
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Since Simon (1955), imperfect knowledge is modeled assuming that the value is 
an extraction from a known aleatory function. In this vein, each firm assumes that other 
firms’ strategy is to randomly pick a price from the distribution function F(p). 
 
 Property 1: If firms guarantee price matching, the equilibrium market 
price will be unique and equal to the monopoly price 
Proof: If a seller guarantee that matches other firms’ price, all buyers that ask 
him the price, will buy. That result, on average, the quantity Q/N. In this way, a firm 
that affix price P have the expected profit formalized by next expression: 
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 In a Nash equilibrium situation, the F(x) function will be such that the expected 
profit function is horizontal (expected profit is identical to all prices observed in the 
market). In particular, considering there is a maximum price, Pmax, and a minimum 
price, Pmin, for both extreme prices, it will result the same expected profit: 
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The average price is in-between Pmin and Pmax. Being so, one may assume k  
[0,1] and rewriting this expression results that Pmin must be equal to Pmax: 
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 Assuming that all firms set price P, except one firm that sets p, if p is smaller 
than P, that firm’s expected profit is pNQpE /)( . If p is higher than P, that firm’s 
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expected profit is PpNQpE )1(/)( . Thus, the firm’s profit is increasing 
with the price affixed so the firm will affix the monopoly price (since there is at least 
one uninformed buyer). By symmetry, all firms set the monopoly price. 
 Assuming as Burdett and Judd (1983) that buyers have a positive search cost, 
the introduction of firms’ price-matching cause the disappearing of equilibrium points 
with search and price dispersion so the unique equilibrium consists in sellers behaving 
as if they where monopolists.        QED 
 This result is identical to that of Salop (1986) and Corts (1995) who assume 
perfect knowledge. 
 
3. Second strategy: firms beat other firms’ prices 
 Now I investigate, in a market equilibrium situation, if it is optimal a firm to 
promise a priori to pay the price difference plus a compensation sum to everyone that 
finds a price lower than the seller guarantees and if that increases competition.  
 
 Claim 1: Price beat with compensation is an anti competitive strategy. 
Proof: All buyers that search a firm buy there at price P. But a fraction (1 – ) of 
them will ask the price to another seller and if they find a smaller price, they recover the 
price difference plus a percentage compensation (1 – ), 1    0. Being so, the 
expected profit of that firm when it affixes price P is: 
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 In equilibrium, the expected profit function is horizontal. Therefore, from the 
minimum price, Pmin, and maximum price, Pmax, it must result the same expected 
profit:  
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As explained, the average price is in-between Pmin and Pmax (0 < k < 1) 
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Comparing this value with the standard model of Wilde and Schwartz (1979), 
where /)2min(max PP , the price beating strategy decreases competition 
because 
2
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.       QED 
Nevertheless, price-beating guarantees increase the competitiveness in relation to 
the price-matching strategy because the difference between maximum price and 
minimum price observed in the market is increasing with compensation, 1 – . 
 
 Property 2: In market equilibrium, price beating strategy is dominated by 
price matching strategy, so no firm will adopt such strategy. 
Proof: It is known that if  = 1, there is no price dispersion so the market average 
price is equal to the maximum price (Property 1). If  < 1, whatever is the price 
dispersion distribution, F(x), the market average price, 
max
min
)(
P
P
dxxxf , is not higher than 
the maximum price. Then, if a seller affixes the maximum price, his expected profit that 
results from expression (4) is increasing with : 
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Being so, in a situation of market equilibrium, sellers do not have incentives to 
price beat but only to price matching (  = 1) other sellers, situation already studied 
above. 
           QED 
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Note that Corts (1995)’s result that price beating guarantee is pro-competitive and 
that push the market to the perfect competition situation (Pmax = Pmin = 0) is a 
particular result of my model for  = 0.  
 
4. Conclusion 
 I derive theoretically that, under imperfect knowledge, price-beating strategy is 
anti competitive. Nevertheless, this strategy is not in the interest of sellers because it is 
dominated by price matching strategy. This theoretical result is in conflict with Corts 
(1995)’s but it is in accordance with the very low occurrence of such phenomena in real 
world. 
The price matching strategy is a limit situation of the price beating strategy and it is an 
anti-competitive strategy, resulting that sellers behave as if they where monopolist. 
Therefor, the price matching strategy interferes with competition promoting collusion 
among traders, which results in losses to society. 
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